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Abstract: Connecting reception theory and social semiotics, this article offers a
framework for the analysis of hortatory texts. An illustrative case uses the
pronouncements of environmental regulators, with the reader group represented
by a sample of executives in financial institutions. Although the participants
thought the texts important, none had found any use for them. It is unlikely that
financial institutions en masse will address environmental issues before and
until communicators frame their material in terms of customary financial dis-
course and investors’ dominant cognitive rationalities. The depth of insights
gained suggests wider application of the framework to a range of hortatory texts
and authoritative reader groups.
Keywords: social semiotics, reception theory, financial institutions, environmen-
tal regulation, rationalities, frames
1 Introduction
This article offers a social semiotics framework that facilitates identification of
the ways that authoritative reader groups understand hortatory texts. Rather
than treating readers as passive recipients of texts, this article treats readers as
having some authority and thus as contributing to the settled meanings of
hortatory texts. The approach bridges audience studies, which recognizes the
presence of the reader in communication situations, and social semiotics,
which recognizes readers as both producing and being produced by the social
system.
An illustrative case is provided using a judgmental sample of authoritative
readers of two types of hortatory communications. Selected senior executives
at pension schemes, investment banks, mutual funds, advisory firms and
professional societies located in the US, Europe, Japan, and Australia, all of
whom have claimed to be interested in environmental issues, are asked to
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discuss how they understand and interpret two types of texts issued between
2002 and 2010, the latter being the time of the study. The first group of texts is
“environmental performance reports”, all of which are in the public domain
and issued by certain nonstate associations and concerning companies listed
on the world’s major stock exchanges. The second is environmental regula-
tions and associated pronouncements issued by governmental agencies. In the
usual case, these documents invite financial institutions to take account of
environmental matters in their lending and investing decisions – without,
however, articulating how that might actually be achieved. It was expected
that financial institutions would discount the documents as, typically, this
material does not appeal to financiers’ everyday concerns of liquidity, profit-
ability, market momentum, and fiduciary obligations. Standard financial
investment theory predicts that financial institutions will dismiss information
that they expect will not affect their financial stakes.
Unexpectedly, participants’ attitudes towards the material are various
and ambiguous, with responses ranging from endorsement to rejection and
on occasion both. As expected, however, none had found much use for either
type of communications. The communications considered here can be char-
acterized by a notion that sustainable development is best supported by the
creation of new financial technologies such as carbon emissions permits
markets (Haigh 2011). However, the everyday rationalities of financial markets
are opportunism (in the sense of taking cash windfalls where available),
economic growth, and investment risk – rationalities that are either absent
or superficially present in environmental regulation. Financiers and investors,
of course, are not averse to economic growth and new financial markets, but
a common framing element between the financial community and environ-
mental communicators is found wanting. For so long as this particular
cognitive framing gap exists, it can be expected that financial institutions
will remain equivocal towards environmental regulation and the associated
performance of companies in which they are invested. More generally, the
range and depth of insights gained suggest that a social semiotics approach
is suited to analysis of a range of hortatory texts and a range of authoritative
reader groups.
The article is structured as follows. The next section uses three sub-sections
to describe the motivation for the study, the public discourse of the environ-
ment, and the study’s design. The empirical material is then presented in two
sections according to communications that have been issued by certain special-
interest associations and environmental regulators, respectively. A closing sec-
tion presents a summary analysis.
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2 Motivation and approach
Several lacunae motivate the present study. A complex investigation into the
communication situation of regulation should aim to capture the strategies
between participants in that discourse (e.g., Hart and Nisbet 2012) as well as
identify the “framing gaps” between readers and communicators (Lakoff 2010).
Investigation of communications between financial institutions and regulators is
warranted by findings that actors in financial institutions make use of messy,
“real-world” communications (see, Roberts et al. 2006). Such findings challenge
standard financial theory that holds that financial institutions should be con-
cerned only with the variability of economic returns at the level of the entire
portfolio (see, Sharpe 1992). There is, moreover, a practical motivation for this
study. The take-up of environmental regulation by the world’s heaviest-polluting
companies is influenced by the ways that their majority owners (institutions such
as pension funds and insurance companies [Peters 2011]) recognize environmental
considerations in their lending and investing decisions (Richardson 2011).
2.1 Analytical approach
The analytical approach derives in the first place from an assumption in audience
studies that communication analysis is properly directed towards appreciating what
the textmaymean to a reader. That assumption is heightened in the case of groups of
readers that, by virtue of the powerful social positions they occupy, have the power to
shape discourses and “settle” the prevailing meanings of hortatory mass-commu-
nications. The late British cultural theorist Stuart Hall (Hall et al. 1978) called these
authoritative types of readers “primary definers.” We have presumed that the way
that financial institutions construe the public discourse of the environment will bear
on the take-up of environmental regulation. Hence, we are minded to characterize
financial institutions as primary definers of environmental communications.
Stuart Hall suggested that readers’ particular constructions of texts, which he
called “reading positions,” can shed light on the prevailing meanings of hortatory
texts. The basic premise of reception theory and reader-positioning theory is this: a
reader initially understands a given text by wholly or partially accepting that text’s
“preferred” reading (Wren-Lewis 1983: 184) or “dominant code.” The dominant code
of the text, which amounts to the authorial intention of the text, can be identified by
reference to the concepts and ideologies it contains. Hall suggested two extreme
reading positions and one other falling between: a confirmatory reading that occurs
where a reader unconditionally approves of a text’s dominant code, or where the
reader reproduces or amplifies its dominant code; an oppositional reading that occurs
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when a reader dismisses the text outright or dismisses its dominant code; and a
negotiated reading that would indicate the reader’s conditional acceptance of a text.
In the latter case, the readermay call for modifications to the text rather than reject it
outright (Hall 1980: 137).
We claim that the obvious difficulty of determining a reading position solely
by reference to the statements a reader may make about a text can be addressed
by having attention to the context in which texts are read. In this regard, we have
recourse to social semiotics. We recognize that the cultural, institutional, and
organizational contexts of communications act as filters that influence readers. In
systemic functional linguistics, the social context of speech, or its “social semio-
tic,” can be described in three aspects: tenor, field, and mode (Halliday 1978).
– The tenor of the relations between readers and texts shapes readers’ needs.
An example of tenor is the reader’s need for clarity of communication.
– The field of social process refers to what is going on at the time the text is
read. An example of field is the readers’ occupational use of a particular text.
– Mode refers to how a reader understands a text in terms of the discourse in
which it appears. Of these three aspects of context, mode is the closest to
the “dominant code” concept (already described above), as mode focuses
on readers’ cognitive frames (Lakoff 2010). An investment-banking cognitive
frame around environmental communications, for example, would contain
the semantic roles of Chief Investment Officer, Board of Trustees, Analyst,
Portfolio, Investment Risk, and Information. Understanding an investment-
banking frame would involve identifying how these roles interact and how
they relate to the meanings and values that prevail in financial markets.
The financial markets represent one of the two sources of environmental com-
munications of interest in this article. Several nonstate associations claiming to
represent the interests of financial institutions have issued hundreds of docu-
ments since 2002 (see, Haigh 2011) that comment on the “environmental perfor-
mance” levels of public companies listed on the world’s major securities
exchanges. A second source of environmental communications is regulatory
agencies. Environmental regulation is a coercive regime in which regulated
entities are encouraged to self-regulate, self-assess and, generally, to act respon-
sibly with a market system. Regulators’ communications consist of preambles to
legislation and decisions, consultation papers, review papers, information bul-
letins, interpretations, and various sets of “guidelines.” The efficacy of environ-
mental regulations such as investment grants, taxation concessions, certificates
attaching to real property, consumption incentives, and tradable polluting
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permits systems depends on the circulation of hortatory language. Given the
coercive nature of the environmental regulation regime, it is not surprising that
much of regulators’ communications is hortatory. Communications from non-
state special-interest associations1 and regulators form the object of this study.
Table 1 below provides a selective list of regulators’ communications issued in
Europe, the US, Japan, and Australia.
1 The Carbon Disclosure Project; the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies
(US); the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (based in Europe); the Investor
Group on Climate Change (Australasia); and the Investor Network on Climate Risk (US).
Table 1: Selected regulators’ communications.
Regulator Communication
European Communication, An energy policy for Europe [COM ()  final]
Commission Communication, Corporate social responsibility – a business contribution to
sustainable development [COM ()  final]
Decision //EC of  July  establishing guidelines for the
monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions
Directive //EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading
Directive //EC on environmental liability with regard to the
prevention and remedying of environmental damage
Directorate-General of the Environment, , Environment policy review
part 
United Kingdom Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Guidelines on
greenhouse gases emissions reporting, 
US Environmental Reporting Authority Interpretive Bulletin  CFR .–
relating to written statements of investment policy
Securities and Exchange Commission, Guidance Regarding Disclosure
Related to Climate Change, Release Nos. –; –; FR-
Securities and Exchange Commission, Compliance & Disclosure
Interpretation of Regulation S-K of  CFR (Part ) Governing Material
Information
Informing on the Statutory Financial Filings Made by US Companies
Japan Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Reporting System and Voluntary Emissions
Trading Scheme, 
Australia Australian Securities and Exchange Commission, Guidance on disclosure
about labour standards and environmental, social and ethical
considerations in (investment) product disclosure statements, 
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Regulations, 
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2.3 The environment discourse
Our focus on the salience of the institutional and social contexts in which
material is read warrants at this point an outline of the public discourse of the
environment. According to a book-length discussion found in Kysar (2010),
environmental regulation can be characterized along four concepts: financiali-
zation, ecological modernization, sustainable development, and a risk manage-
ment approach that refers to a “balancing” of costs and benefits. Each of these
concepts is sketched in what follows immediately below.
Financialization is a finance-led growth regime that appeared in the late
1970s with the deregulation of international trade and the global integration of
stock and capital markets (Kysar 2010: 5–7). An example of financialization is
the construction of elaborate financial architecture as environmental regula-
tors’ preferred approach.
Ecological modernization is a rationalist calculus that stems from three ideas:
that industrial activity has systematically harmful effects on native ecological
subsystems; that modifying industrial activity can arrest those harmful effects;
and that all natural ecosystems have the potential to be given an economic value
(Everett and Neu 2000). According to Kysar (2010), ecological modernization has
driven the design of environmental regulation since the United Nations issued
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992.
The idea that ecological problems can be solved by redesigning industrial
activity lends validity to the concept of sustainable development. The principal
techniques of sustainable development are an increasingly efficient use of factor
inputs in globalized product and financial markets and greater available
amounts of financial capital achieved through the investment function. One
might imagine that financial institutions looking to allocate funds towards
assets promising future cash dividends and that might be sold for cash surpluses
would find appealing the sustainable development concept, as its efficiency
aspect caters for liquidity and its investment logic promotes market growth.
A fourth rubric in environmental regulation is the “precautionary principle,”
a concept once frequently seen in environmental regulators’ communications
but today much less so (Turner and Hartzell 2004). Instance is mention of the
precautionary principle in the environmental protection article of the European
Union (Art. 191, Commission of the European Communities 2010). According to
the precautionary principle, environmental risk is best represented using a
comparison of expected short-run economic costs and benefits (Kysar 2010: 9;
also see, European Environment Agency 2013).
Commonly, financial institutions manage investment portfolios using a cost/
benefit logic, and so it might be expected that financial institutions would use
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the logics of financialization, ecological modernization, sustainable develop-
ment, and risk management to understand environmental issues, regulation,
and associated narratives.
2.4 Case design
A judgmental sample of readers is drawn from a group of pension funds,
insurance schemes, investment banks, advisory firms, and professional societies
located in the US, Europe, Japan, and Australia, all of which have claimed to be
interested in environmental issues. The individuals participating in this study
can be treated as primary definers on the bases that they occupy relatively
powerful social positions by virtue of their organizational positions and that
they have personal histories of being outspoken with regards to environmental
communications.
Thirty interviewees were obtained for this study. Interviewees were asked to
discuss environmental narratives (the set of which is described above) and mate-
rial issued by environmental regulators between 2002 and 2010. All interviews
were conducted between May and August of 2010. Arrangements were made for
sixteen face-to-face interviews; the remaining interviews were made by telephone.
Interviewees are located in Europe (15), US (10), Australia (4), and Japan (1).
Following a data-filtering process, forty-two interview extracts are selected
as a representative database. One in two participants carry investment manage-
ment responsibilities. Just over one in three (37 per cent) are analysts, that is, are
engaged or employed by financial institutions to provide assessments of “invest-
able” assets.
Analysis of interview data proceeds by noting the general characteristics of
interview extracts and what appears as a general pattern in the data. The read-
ing position concept is operationalized by identifying for each interview extract
a point on a spectrum that has approval and disapproval as its end-points. These
points are initially identified by observing speakers’ positive and negative con-
notations (tones of voice, pauses and interjections, and so on).
Several techniques are then used to confirm or disconfirm the initially
identified reading positions, as follows. Interviewees’ positive self-definitions
are identified by marking in the data where specific ways of acting are validated
or are presented as self-evident. Attention is directed to lexical emphasis, in
particular, pronoun shift, as this may indicate speakers’ advocacy of particular
perspectives and resistance to the role that a particular communication situation
imposes (Adams and Harré 2001). Shifters, referring to changes in voice and tone
of verbal data, can function differently in a given communication situation but
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have one aspect in common: they work to change the meaning of text. Using
shifters in indirect speech allows the speaker to comment on what has been said.
Additional techniques are a distancing exercise and identification of con-
textual factors. Fiske (1990: 109) defines distancing as “changing a unit in the
system and assessing the change in meaning, if any, that has occurred.”
Distancing allows the analyst to ask whether there are competing discourses
to those of the central character. The distancing technique chosen in this study
is identification of the central character in the interview extract, followed by
substitution of other characters and identification of any changes of meaning.
Contextual factors that might bear on interviewees’ statements are institutional
structures, resources available to interviewees, interviewees’ “extracurricular”
activities, and aspects of the research setting.
The next two sections present the empirical material according to commu-
nications issued by nonstate actors and regulators, respectively.
3 Environmental narratives issued
by nonstate actors
The interview extracts presented in this and the next sections are anonymized
following the requests of the interviewees. The following identification codes
appear after each extract as relevant: pm¼portfolio manager; fi¼fiduciary trustee
or investment scheme director; ss¼“sell-side” information provider; ih¼“in-
house” advisor employed by a financial institution; pe¼private equity investor.
This section examines interviewees’ statements concerning their under-
standings and constructions of what we will call environmental narratives.
This material is descriptive of major listed companies’ pollutant levels, environ-
mental management programs, and their exposures to environmental regula-
tion. Invariably, this material exhorts its target audience (financial institutions)
to make lending and investing decisions according to companies’ assessed
“environmental performance” levels.
The literature expects financial institutions to relegate environmental narra-
tives behind traditional financial information such as profits, net assets, and
cash flows (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh 2003). In that respect, the observed
readings of environmental narratives are unexpected. All three of Stuart Hall’s
reading positions are occupied, where it was expected that participants would
all occupy the oppositional position. The extract below, drawn from an interview
with a director of the research department in a US mutual funds group, illus-
trates a confirmatory reading position.
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[Extract 1] There are many more forms of risk [for companies] associated with
the environment than litigation risk. It’s nice if a company has some-
thing contextual to say about its operations, physical, and brand-
name risks associated with climate change. (D-ih)
The absence of explicit evaluation of environmental narratives (in extract 1
above, referring to narratives issued by companies and also by associations
such as the Carbon Disclosure Project) indicates an open position. On probing,
“nice” translates to a confirmatory position but also to her organization’s limited
use of environmental narratives.
In addition to the three observed unitary reading positions, several ambig-
uous positions are identified. For convenience, these are labeled “substituted
positions” and “dual positions.” A substituted position is suggested by an
interview extract that indicates a movement from one particular reading position
to another. A dual position occupies two categories.
The following extract, supplied by an Australian trustee director of a group
of public-sector pension schemes, constitutes a substituted reading position.
[Extract 2] The Carbon Disclosure Project is more advanced [than other sources of
environmental narratives] but is not usable. The data normalization
process is problematic. Then there are barriers in the consolidation
reporting approach which come from problems in how to treat supply
chains. (J-fi)
The positive and negative connotations in the initial sentence of extract 2 above
suggest a conflicted meaning. The conjunctive adverb (“then”) beginning the
final sentence connotes the perceived persistence of a problem. Antagonistic
synonyms (“problematic, barriers, problems”) imply an expectation that envir-
onmental narratives have use-value. These aspects suggest an initial confirma-
tory position, immediately modified by a negotiated position.
Some substituted positions coincide with interviewees’ occupational roles.
One interviewee related that he had gone on several “missions to Brussels” (in
point, the offices of the European Environment Directorate-General) in an
attempt to convince regulators to mandate environmental information disclo-
sures that would “make sense” to investors. The interviewee related that this
activity had been performed in the capacity of his role as unpaid chair of a
certain investor group interested in climate-change issues. His concurrent senior
salaried role in a European public-sector pension scheme may have motivated
him to frame the “Environment” in economic terms. The dual roles presented, he
admitted, a particular problem for reconciliation. His solution was to frame the
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“whole environmental agenda” through a fiduciary lens. The comments in this
paragraph (designated collectively as [Extract 3], X-ih) suggest the same sub-
stituted position as above: a confirmatory position (re the pro bono role) that
shifts to a negotiated position (re the salaried role).
A similar cognitive movement appears from speakers in other occupational
contexts. The next extract, from a representative of a professional society,
indicates a confirmatory position regarding the use-value of environmental
narratives, resolving in a negotiated position with respect to the expressed
intentions of his members.
[Extract 4] Carbon reporting is used only for the corporate governance angle. It’s
useful for proxy voting … We are not willing to negotiate on these issues
until such time as it is clear they are material to the interests of our
members (C-ih)
A substituted position in a different direction (from oppositional to negotiated)
appears in the next extract.
[Extract 5] If a company provides a carbon intensity figure we would have to
reverse-engineer it into the financial statements. It would help if there
were a standard financial measure used so we could compare a
company to its peers. (F-ih)
Extract 5 above, supplied by an analyst employed by a US public-sector pension
scheme, gives that because environmental narratives are not standardized in the
sense of informational items in financial statements, they do not informational
value. The extract concludes that if “standardization” were to occur, the narra-
tives might be found of value.
Like extract 5 above, an oppositional to negotiated movement is observed in
the following extract.
[Extract 6] Reporting does not influence investment decisions in and of itself.
Companies are generally careful to ensure that material price implica-
tions that may be reflected in their disclosures are addressed before
they are disclosed. This will change only once there is a price on
carbon. (D-fi)
In extract 6 above, environmental narratives are found wanting in terms of the
customary rationalities of investment management. A certain modification
becomes a condition of acceptance (“only once there is a price on carbon”).
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The same speaker related that he had lobbied regulators on “that single issue”
(the usefulness of information), opining that “the most critical policy in Australia
is a price on carbon emissions” and that “the soft stuff that has come out is not
going to change until we get that” (collectively, [Extract 7], D-fi). These com-
ments, again, describe an oppositional to negotiated movement.
Observed substituted reading positions
Confirmatory → negotiated
Oppositional → negotiated
The semantic field (Lakoff 2010) of “Usefulness” is pivotal in the substituted
reading positions identified above. All but three interviewees had collected
environmental narratives for some years, yet none had used them for any
practical purpose. One interviewee, the head of the environmental research
department of an asset management company in London’s financial district,
related that she was not in the practice of reading environmental narratives as
they information they contained was “soft” (the term also appears in extract 7
above). Useful information was that which could be used to identify exploitable
economic “opportunities.” This attitude, held widely in the sample, did not
prevent participants in this study from collecting environmental narratives,
ready for the day that they might be used. Extract 8 below, supplied by a senior
investment officer of the largest occupational public-sector pension scheme in
the US, illustrates this “wait-and-see” attitude.
[Extract 8] It’s important not to go too fast on this issue but to take each step
persistently. We’ve just announced our decision to integrate ESG [the
acronym is widely used in the financial markets to denote “environ-
mental, social, and governance” considerations] into everything we
do. (AD-pm)
4 Regulators’ communications
Interviewees were asked to discuss material issued by environmental regula-
tors in the US, Europe, and elsewhere between 2002 and 2010, a volatile
period in environmental politics. This material discusses – invariably in a
hortatory style – existing and presaged measures such as emissions permits
trading mechanisms, accounting measurement of emissions volumes, emis-
sions taxes, and energy-usage subsidies. As expected, the interview extracts
in this category are strongly rhetorical, most promoting positive self-
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definitions. Unexpectedly, however, the analysis identifies a complex set of
reading positions.
A typical negative connotation in respect of environmental regulation is that
“governments” had “got it wrong.” The following extract is indicative.
[Extract 9] This [that the generation of industrial pollutants is currently uncosted]
is a market failure and that governments haven’t corrected it themselves
through primary legislation is a profoundly sad indictment of the policy
environment. We have set out what the markets need in detail. We have
sent in what is wrong with the carbon markets. Policy-wise, we have set
out the things we would like to see changed and then, from a global
perspective, we have stated the kind of deal that we need. In short, it
needs to be global; there needs to be a carbon market; it needs to be
fungible; and the U.N. must realize that it is not communicating to the
financial markets. (Z-ih)
Negative allusions and lexical repetition in extract 9 (“what is wrong with the
carbon markets, market failure, carbon market, financial markets”) suggest
that financialization and sustainable development are the speaker’s dominant
rationalities.2 Negative allusions to a problem (“profoundly sad indictment”) are
rhetorically paired with a solution in the form of financial institutions. The legitimacy
of that pairing is emphasized using lexical repetition and anaphora (“we have set out,
we have sent in,we have set out,we have stated” followedby “it needs to be, there needs
to be, it needs to be”). These aspects are sufficient to characterize extract 9 as a
substituted reading position (moving from negotiated to oppositional).
Three dual positions are observed with respect to regulators’ communica-
tions. The following extract provides a confirmatory position in respect of the
potential economic benefits of environmental regulation and a negotiated posi-
tion in respect of the outcomes observed to date.
[Extract 10] Governments need to provide the right kind of subsidies so that
investors – meaning long-term investors – will bring their acts and
their money to the table. (N-ih)
2 At the time of interview, the interviewee supplying extract 9 held an advisory position in a
British insurance company and a pro-bono membership of the Aldersgate Group, a potentially
influential lobby group of financial institutions, industrial companies, and parliamentarians
that has set out to influence the passage of environmental regulation in England. The references
to “we” in extract 9 are, on enquiry, references to the activity of the Aldersgate Group.
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The periphrastic adjective “right kind” in extract 10 above connotes that the
speaker (a senior executive of a Scandinavian insurance company) endorses
revenue-creating measures but not cost-creating measures. The double meta-
phor (“bring their acts and their money to the table”) refers to the bargaining
table of environmental regulation and, perhaps, to the similarity that investing
has with card games.
Another observed position is both confirmatory and oppositional.
[Extract 11] Will America make the same mistakes as Europe has with cap-and-
trade markets? Cap-and-trade to my mind has been an abject failure
so far – the carbon price is too low. Whether it’s actually achieved any
carbon reduction is very debatable. (X-ih)
In extract 11 above, financialization and ecological modernization are endorsed
in the comments “the carbon price is too low” and “Whether it’s actually achieved
any carbon reduction,” respectively. An oppositional stance with respect to
regulators’ communications is indicated by modified clauses (“same mistakes,
abject failure, too low, very debatable”).
Three interviewees, without prompting by the researcher, suggested how
regulators’ communications might further their interests. The following extract
provides one set of suggestions.
[Extract 12] Just from an investment perspective, all we need is certainty. That’s all
legislators need to do – provide us with certainty of legislation. But for
as long as you don’t know what the price of carbon is, for as long as
you don’t know what the legislation will be, for as long as you don’t
know what disclosure is going to be, absolutely nothing’s going to
happen. Policy makers have done nothing that we can use. We should
be buying and selling the companies that stand to win and lose from
policy measures. We cannot, because we don’t know who will win or
lose. If we don’t know what the cost of carbon is, then we don’t know
which companies are active in environmental management, because
they don’t tell us. (N-ih)
The plural pronoun in extract 12 above sets up an us-and-them division.
Anaphoric repetition (“for as long as you don’t know” appears three times)
frames a challenge and an ultimatum (“absolutely nothing’s going to happen”).
Another set of anaphora (“we don’t know who, we don’t know what, we don’t
know which”) suggests a dismissive reading position. Accordingly, extract 12 is
characterized as a dual negotiated and oppositional position.
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Observed dual reading positions
Confirmatory & negotiated
Confirmatory & oppositional
Negotiated & oppositional
The range and complexity of the identified reading positions above warrant a
summary.
The relevant extracts fall into two groups. One group, which might be called
“passive,” finds environmental regulators’ communications relevant in so far as
they indicate broad economic trends. The other group, which might be labeled
“activist,” seeks to modify environmental regulators’ communications such that
they would match the purposes of financial institutions.
For “passive” readers, the institution of the index – what might be called a
conformance rationality – serves to bracket environmental issues along with
broad, macroeconomic issues considered as a matter of course in the portfolio
construction process. The following extract, supplied by a director of an infor-
mation research department of a North American funds management group,
illustrates the “passive” group.
[Extract 13] Climate investing is more likely to be about single companies rather
than across sectors. The sector view is shaped by reading the tea
leaves on the macro view of the economy. After forming a sector
view, we decide whether we are underweight or overweight. (D-ih)
The “underweight or overweight” phrase in extract 13 above suggests the salience
of a conformance rationality in passive-styled, index-tracking portfolio investors
(the majority of the sample).
In contrast, “activist” readers seek to shape environmental regulation (and
also companies’ responses to environmental regulation) such that financial
institutions benefit economically (refer to extract 12 above, “We should be buying
and selling the companies that stand to win and lose from policy measures.”).
It is noted that institutional influences are relevant across both groups. A
penultimate extract illustrates.
[Extract 14] Carbon trading is just a thing that’s out there – we’ll have a look at it
when we have to. When this came up in open discussion this morning
with our wider investment group, we told them we’re having a look at
it. The instant response was “That’s five years.” Now in any normal
client mandate, a comment “That’s five years” means “That doesn’t
exist, it doesn’t matter, that’s five years.” (N-ih)
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The interviewee giving extract 14 above, who at the time worked as a sustain-
ability advisor at a British insurer, explained that “five years” is a term used
widely in the financial community to refer to irrelevant information. In the
usual course of business, events expected outside the scope of a five-year
horizon, such as those typically heralded in environmental regulators’ com-
munications, would not reach the desks of the investment team. In the words
of another interviewee, “It’s difficult to break the investment bank mould” (Y-ss)
[Extract 15].
5 Concluding remarks
Three observed rationalities of the participants in this study deserve mention.
First, an “opportunism” rationality describes a strategy to take cash windfalls
where available. Portfolio-holding financial institutions in the business of sup-
plying cash payments to members and policyholders can be expected to treat
liquidity preservation as a central rationality. Second, a “fiduciary obligation”
rationality refers to the legal responsibilities of persons responsible for invest-
ment schemes to pursue only those opportunities expected to “maximize” the
economic interests of scheme members. In point, participants in this study
feared that because capital markets are not concerned primarily with environ-
mental considerations but with economic considerations, that having concern
for the former may be seen as potentially compromising clients’ interests. Third,
a “conformance” rationality refers to a conservative management approach
whereby the financial assets held in the portfolio are made to conform to the
composition of major equity and bond securities exchanges. Risk-sensitive
financial institutions tend to make decisions in a self-referential fashion, sur-
round themselves with close networks of analysts and advisors (Roberts et al.
2006) and, generally, are careful not to be seen as mavericks. These rationalities,
we claim, contributed to the cognitive frames through which participants in the
study interpreted environmental regulation and environmental narratives.
Figure 1 below provides a visual summary of the empirical outcomes dis-
cussed in the two sections above.
Unitary reading positions (shown in Figure 1 below as free circles) represent
a minority (five interview extracts) and emerge only in the category of environ-
mental narratives. The majority of the interview extracts exhibit relatively more
ambiguous reading positions.
The two substituted reading positions in the environmental narratives cate-
gory (confirm→negotiate; oppose→negotiate) suggest a cognitive process in
readers that oscillates between rejection and endorsement. The observed
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indeterminacy might be associated with our observation that although all parti-
cipants had collected environmental narratives, none had found a use for them.
To explain further, we would mention once more the commonplace rationalities
of financial investing. The participants in this study approved of financializa-
tion, eco-modernization, and sustainable development where it was recognized
in environmental narratives. This approval did not lead, however, to wholesale
endorsement of the “code” of environmental narratives.
Two further rationalities that this group of readers requires are absent from
environmental narratives. We might label these two (absent) rationalities as
“opportunism” (desire to take cash windfalls where available) and “fiduciary
obligation” (translating as routine priority given to economic considerations).
We suggest, accordingly, that these lacunae contextualize the “wait-and-see”
attitude inferred from the substituted reading positions.
Turning now to the pronouncements of environmental regulators, the only
substituted position identified is “negotiate→oppose,” which we explain as a
product of readers’ frustrated search for economic opportunities in this type of
hortatory text. Figure 1 denotes dual reading positions as double-stopped dotted
lines. Three dual positions are observed (“confirm” and “negotiate”; “confirm”
and “oppose”; and “negotiate” and “oppose”). It might be expected that mutual
concern for environmental issues and economic interests would present difficul-
ties for financial institutions. In that regard, it is not so surprising to observe
cognitive dualities. The dual reading positions echo a tension noted in some of
the interview extracts between an “other-directedness,” something akin to
Text Genre Confirm Position Negotiate Position Oppose Position
Environmental Narratives
Environmental Regulators’ Communications
Figure 1: Identified reading positions.
Free circles depict unitary reading positions corresponding to the categories shown. Solid
directional lines depict “substituted” reading positions. Dotted double-stopped lines depict
“dual” reading positions.
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altruism or religious fervor, the legitimacy of which is more often in doubt, and a
more narrow regard for economic considerations, the legitimacy of which is
never in much doubt.
It is noted that none of the interview extracts contain mention of the
“precautionary principle” that marks early pronouncements such as 1992’s Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development. In terms of typical capital market
rationalities, the precautionary principle would justify a financial institution
having regard to costly pollution mitigation measures in order to stem greater
costs in the future. The outcomes of the present study are suggestive, however,
that the financial community has not framed “the Environment” using a pre-
cautionary logic. The interview extracts are marked, rather, by rationalities that
can be associated with economic opportunism.
This article has finessed Stuart Hall’s reading positioning scheme to include
less determinative positions lying between and astride the “accept,” “negotiate,”
and “reject” reading positions. The wide range of constructions from a relatively
homogenous group of participants is unexpected in terms of conventional
finance theory and, generally, is supportive of a social semiotics approach.
The empirical observations presented above suggest that reading positions are
properly characterized as dynamic, particularly in situations where texts exhort
readers to endorse specific ideological codes. In that respect, the outcomes of
this study suggest that reading theories point to complex phenomena deserving
of further research. In point, the depth of insights obtainable with the framework
suggests its wider use in discourses where the institutional status of reader
groups is important.
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